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IN THE SUPRE.ME, COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LAlVIAR H. CARLSON and BETTY
~1. CARLSON, his wife,

Plaintiff and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No. 8634

W. L. HAMIL'l~ON and ESTELLA
HAl\fiLTON, his wife,

Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the Record. The parties will be referred to as they were in
the ·Trial Court.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment
entered against them in the sum of $2,119.94. The sum
awarded by the trial court was the difference between
the total amount paid under the terms of a written sales
agreement, and the actual damages suffered by defendants as a result of plaintiffs inability to perform
said sales agreement.
The sales agreement which is the subject of this
action is dated October 1, 1952, and pertains to approximately 160 acres of farm land of defendants located near
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the City of Fairview, County of Sanpete, State of
Utah. The property is divided into approximately 80
acres of cultivated land with water rights (R 59) of
which from 8 to 10 acres is designated as meadow land,
(R 61) and 80 acres of dry pasture or hill ground (R
61). Included in the sale was a six room two story home
and certain farm machinery (R16).
The sale price for tl1e farm was the sum of
$22,000.00. This amount was to be paid $5,000 down
and an annual payment of $1,680.00 principal and interest. The plaintiffs paid to defendants the down payment of $5,000.00, and the first annual payment of
$1,000.00 principal and $680.00 interest on January 1,
1954. Plaintiffs were unable to meet the installment
due January 1, 1955 (R. 9), and defendants took possession of the property sometime between the date of
the default by plaintiffs and niarch 1, 1955 (R. 11).
This action was instituted to recover any sums of
1noney in excess of the damages suffered by defendants
as a result of the breach of the agree1nent. The trial
court found that plaintiffs had paid the smn of $6,680.00
and defendants had only been da1naged in the sun1 of
$4,566.06 and a"'"a.rded judgn1ent to plaintiffs for the
difference.
ST.A.TE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND CONsrrRUING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS BEING A
PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

DENIED

DEFENDANTS'

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN Fit·~DING AND CONSTRUING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS BEING A
PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

The main issue presented by defendants' brief IS
whether defendants should be entitled to retain the sum
of $2,119.94 as liquidated damages for plaintiffs' breach
of the sales agreement. The defendants base their right
to retain said sum upon the provisions of the sales
agreement pertaining to liquidated damages. The provisions of the agreement is contained in paragraph 7
and provides as follows :

"* * * but immediately upon the happening
of any breach or default by the buyers, * * *
the Sellers shall have the right to cancel and
rescind this contract, * * * and to hold and retain
all payments made and all improvement upon
said premises as agreed and liquidated damage8
for the breach of this contract, * * *"
Defendants assert this clause of the agreement is
not a penalty because it is an attempt by the parties
to reasonably forecast the just compensation that may
be due defendants for the harm that will be caused
by plaintiffs' breach. The trial court, in support of
plaintiff's position, held that the words "all payments
made'' did not constitute a reasonable forecast of just
compensation. This holding is supported by the evidence
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and is logically sound. To demonstrate the illogic of
defendants' novel forecast argument, assume that the
buyer had paid $21,000.00 of the $22,000.00 total purchase price. Would the recission of the contract and
the keeping of the $21,000.00 as well as the land by the
defendants be just compensation for the breach or would
it be an unreasonable forfeiture~ The posing of the
question indicates only one possible answer.
It is our further position that whether all or a
portion of the purchase price paid by the purchasers
should be retained by the sellers as liquidated dan1ages
or returned to the purchasers as unreasonable forfeiture
is a factual question to be resolved by the court.
In the case at bar the trial court heard all of the
evidence and made findings pertaining to specific items
of damages which the evidence supported. This ruling
by the trial court properly compensated the defendants
for all of their da1nage, and for the court to ha\e
permitted the defendants to retain ··all payntents made"
\Yould have resulted in the enforcen1ent of a forfeiture
and a penalty in the smn of $2,119.94.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLl~
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

DENIED

DEFENDANTS'

))pf\)ndant~~

l\[otion for a X e\\~ Trial \Yas on the
,rround~ of np\\·h~
. di8eOYt:•red eYidence and insufficiencY.
of thP Pvidt)1H·<~ to jn~ti f~~ tht• Yedict.
\Vith rt·~p<)et to the fir8t ground~ that of ne\Yly
di~eoY<~r<)d <\Yid<\net·~ tl1e trial eourt eorrertly exercised
it~ di~eret ion in den~Ting the n1otion for a ne\Y trial.
~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
The granting of a motion for a new trial is generally
within the discretion of the trial court. We submit, however, that before the trial court is permitted to exercise
this discretion in granting a motion for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, the defeated
party must meet certain requirements. These requirements are well stated in the case of Trimble et ux v.
Union Pacifi'c Stages, et al., 142 P. 2d 674, 677, where the
court stated the Utah rule to be as follows:
"Nor do we believe that the lower court
erred in refusing to grant a new trial. The evidence of witnesses Hess and Halahan was cumulative, and it is well settled in this state that
such evidence is not ground for a nevv trial.
I\Jopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712, 714,
wherein it is said: 'It is well settled that, to entitle a defeated party to a new trial on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence, it must
appear, (1) that he used reasonable diligence to
discover and produce at the former trial the
nevvly-discovered evidence, and that his failure
to do so was not the result of his own negligence;
(2) that the newly-discovered evidence is not
simply cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not
sufficient if it simply be to impeach an adverse
witness; ( 4) it must be material to the issues,
and so important as to satisfy the court, by
reasonable inference, that the verdict or judgment would have been different had the newlydiscovered evidence been introduced at the
former trial; (5) that the defeated party had no
opportunity to make the defense, or was prevented from doing so by unavoidable accident,
or the fraud or improper conduct of the other
party, without fault on his part.' See also State
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v. Moore, 41 Utah 247, 126 P. 322. Ann. Cas.
1915·C, 976; Wimmer v. Simon, 9 Utah 378, 35
P. 507; State v. Brown, 48 Utah 279, 159 P. 545."
In the case at bar the newly discovered evidence
is contained in an affidavit of the witness Peterson
and pertains Ito ithe market value of the property involved in the action. The testimony contained in the
affidavit does not meet the requirements outlined in
the Trimble case for two very important reasons. The
first reason is there is no affidavit or other pleading
wherein it appears that counsel used reasonable diligence to discover and produce at the former trial the
newly-discovered evidence or that the failure to produce the said evidence was not his own negligence.
Counsel was unable to make this showing because in
his brief he states the testimony was not produced because he did not believe that the market value of the
property involved in the action would become material.
This is an admission on his part that he did not use
reasonable diligence to secure the evidence and an adInission, also, that he was negligent in failing to anticipate 'vhat plaintiffs contend "~as an obvious issue.
In PerkiHs vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 46S, 243 P. 2d 446,
at page 45:2, this court outlined as an ite1n of drunage
to allow the seller as compensation in the eYent the forfeitun~ clause of n sales agreen1ent is not enforced as
foJJ 0\VH:
u• • • (3) any decline in value due to change
in ntarket value of the property not allo,ved for
in i tPuts nu1nbers 1 nnd 2 * * *"

,.v e

r()~ pt)ctfully

subnli t that counsel

IS

presu1ned
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to have known about the ruling in the Perkins case
and if he did not, his ingnorance in failing to anticipate
this fact is not a basis for granting a new trial.
The second reason is that counsel failed to show
to the trial court that the proposed evidence would have
altered and changed the judgment.
At the trial of the case both parties to the action
introduced evidence pertaining to the reasonable market
value of the property. The plaintiffs called as a witness
a real estate broker who was qualified as an expert in appraising farm land similar to the property in ques.tion
and the defendant qualified as an expert the defendant
and owner of the property W H. Hamilton. These
witness did not differ in their respective appraisals
and the trial court p-roperly concluded that there had
been no change in the market value of the property.
From this testimony it was incumbent upon the
defendant to show to the court that the proposed evidence would alter the judgment. The court was apprised
of the contents of the affidavitt and the qualifications
of the witness Peterson, and we respectfully submit
that his denial of the motion is a ruling he was not
satisfied the evidence would have altered the judgment.
It is the contention of plaintiffs that the proposed
evidence also fails to meet the other three requirements
outlined in the Trimble case, but it is our opinion these
two points are sufficient to show the trial court properly denied the motion.
The trial court properly denied the motion for
new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
dence. Defendants have failed to set forth in what
particular the findings of the court or the judgment
is not supported by the evidence, and we therefore submit, the decision of the trial court should be sustained.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that awarding plaintiffs a
judgment in the sum of $2,119.94 is supported by the
evidence and the law. That the denial of the motion
for a new trial was proper.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Counsel for Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
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